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Taiwan Eyes Zero Tariffs with US, Pledges More Investment

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TAIPEI (Reuters) - Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te on Sunday offered zero tariffs as the basis for talks with the U.S., pledging to remove trade barriers rather than imposing reciprocal measures and saying Taiwanese companies will raise their U.S. investments.

President Donald Trump announced across-the-board import tariffs on Wednesday, with much higher duties for dozens of trading partners, including Taiwan, which runs a large trade surplus with the U.S. and faces a 32% duty on its products.

The U.S. tariffs, however, do not apply to semiconductors, a major Taiwanese export.

In a video message released by his office after meeting executives from small and medium-sized companies at his residence, Lai said given Taiwan’s dependence on trade the economy would inevitably have a hard time dealing with the tariffs, but that he thought the impact could be minimised.

"Tariff negotiations can start with ’zero tariffs’ between Taiwan and the United States, with reference to the U.S.-Canada-Mexico free trade agreement," Lai said.

Taiwan has no plans to take tariff retaliation, and there will be no change in Taiwanese companies’ investment commitments to the United States as long as they are in Taiwan’s interest, he added in comments provided by his office.

Taiwan’s TSMC, the world’s largest contract chipmaker, last month announced an additional $100 billion investment in the U.S.

"In the future, in addition to TSMC’s increased investment, other industries, such as electronics, information and communications, petrochemicals, and natural gas will be able to increase investment in the U.S. and deepen Taiwan-U.S. industrial cooperation," Lai said.

"All purchases will be actively pursued," Lai said.

Non-tariff trade barriers are an indicator for the U.S. to assess the fairness of trade, and Taiwan will proactively resolve non-tariff trade barriers that have existed for many years to make trade negotiations with the U.S. smoother, he added.

The U.S. is Taiwan’s most important international backer and main source of arms, despite the lack of formal diplomatic ties.

Taiwan has faced stepped-up military and political pressure from its giant neighbor China, which views the democratically governed island as Chinese territory, despite the objections of the government in Taipei.

Shortly before Trump’s tariff announcement, China announced the end of its latest round of war games around Taiwan.

Lai said that Taiwan has faced major global crises before and came through those.

© Reuters. FILE PHOTO: Kids view the area from a lookout point over cranes and containers at the Port of Keelung, Taiwan April 3, 2025. REUTERS/Ann Wang/File Photo


"Not only have we been able to overcome the difficulties, but we have also been able to turn crises into opportunities, transforming the Taiwanese economy into a new and more resilient one," he added.

 
What does Trump want Taiwan to buy from the US?

It is hard to tell what Trump really wants but Taiwan is the semiconductor hub of the world so Trump may want some of that. Just between us, I don't think Trump and his political possie are a good match for CC Wei. Like TSMC on a whole, CC has a very wise and powerful circle of customers and confidants.
 
Taiwan is quite different from Ukraine or Israel. There was an un-official poll asking University students about the response of China invasion recently. Astonishingly there are 70% students decided to surrender for no war. It is controversial that who are the real stakeholders in this Taiwan Strait Conflicts.
 
Taiwan is quite different from Ukraine or Israel. There was an un-official poll asking University students about the response of China invasion recently. Astonishingly there are 70% students decided to surrender for no war. It is controversial that who are the real stakeholders in this Taiwan Strait Conflicts.

I believe this. Ukraine is a horrible reminder that there are no winners in a war like that and China has a much stronger military than Russia. The Taiwan Army would be decimated. My bet is that China would wait until Trump is gone before starting anything with Taiwan. The Silicon Shield is stronger than ever.
 
I believe this. Ukraine is a horrible reminder that there are no winners in a war like that and China has a much stronger military than Russia. The Taiwan Army would be decimated. My bet is that China would wait until Trump is gone before starting anything with Taiwan. The Silicon Shield is stronger than ever.
Xi is not stupid enough to try, he's quite smart in fact. If an order came down from him to attack Taiwan right now, his generals would take a long and hard look at their personal utility functions. Unless they're 100% confident that the conflict would only last around 3 days and be relatively bloodless, they might find that it serves them better to head north to Beijing with Uncle Sam's tacit approval. Most Chinese elite, the military included, stash their declared and undeclared assets offshore. One may overhear rather interesting conversations during a meal in an authentic Chinese restaurant in California or New York. It's common parlance that unless something is beyond the reach of Beijing, what ever ill gotten gains you've accumulated is not really yours. Xi knows this too and doubts the true loyalties of his general. The situation might change in a couple years or decades, but Uncle Sam really does hold some really good cards if it comes to a showdown that both sides are smart enough to avoid.

If Xi really wants to be the second coming of Li Shimin, he should look north towards Siberia -- those areas might freely choose to join the Chinese sphere since they'd cut out Moscow as the middleman of any natural resource deals.
 
Taiwan is quite different from Ukraine or Israel. There was an un-official poll asking University students about the response of China invasion recently. Astonishingly there are 70% students decided to surrender for no war. It is controversial that who are the real stakeholders in this Taiwan Strait Conflicts.
As I've posted multiple times before, I think this is the real threat regarding Taiwan.
 
Taiwan is quite different from Ukraine or Israel. There was an un-official poll asking University students about the response of China invasion recently. Astonishingly there are 70% students decided to surrender for no war. It is controversial that who are the real stakeholders in this Taiwan Strait Conflicts.

The people and industry of Taiwan are a minor consideration for the US.

I believe this. Ukraine is a horrible reminder that there are no winners in a war like that and China has a much stronger military than Russia. The Taiwan Army would be decimated. My bet is that China would wait until Trump is gone before starting anything with Taiwan. The Silicon Shield is stronger than ever.

It's not a Trump thing, and although it's not a mandate carved in law or treaty, it’s more a strategic imperative baked into decades of policy and military posture.

As I've said so many times on SemiWiki, and most understand, a war between China and Taiwan, is a war between China and the US.

The First Island Chain, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines—is the real strategic interest. It’s the U.S.’s frontline to box in China’s navy, with Taiwan as the critical pivot. If China breaks it, Japan, South Korea, and U.S. bases in the Pacific take the heat, while China’s trade lifelines (energy, food) get squeezed in return. Losing the chain doesn’t just cost position, it hands Beijing the region on a platter.

The U.S. plays coy with ambiguity on Taiwan, but if China lunges, the response is fierce: the U.S., Japan, Australia, South Korea, maybe NATO, lock the chain tight, carriers and subs patrol, sanctions throttle China’s oil via Malacca and its import-dependent economy (70% oil, 40% food). Taiwan’s defense secures TSMC, but the chain’s the bigger stake, its collapse unravels U.S. power, making it the linchpin of the long game.

China could turn to Russia for oil if Malacca’s choked, already getting 2.2 million barrels daily via pipelines like ESPO and overland routes, its top supplier. But China’s 15 million barrel-per-day demand dwarfs that, with 70% shipped by sea. Russia’s land routes, even at max, cover just 15-20%, and scaling up is slow, pipelines are tapped, rail’s limited, and new builds take years. Russia’s 5 million barrel export cap, split among buyers, can’t fully compensate. Sanctions or sea blockades would still cripple China’s supply, making Russia a partial lifeline, not a solution.
 
The people and industry of Taiwan are a minor consideration for the US.



It's not a Trump thing, and although it's not a mandate carved in law or treaty, it’s more a strategic imperative baked into decades of policy and military posture.

As I've said so many times on SemiWiki, and most understand, a war between China and Taiwan, is a war between China and the US.

The First Island Chain, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines—is the real strategic interest. It’s the U.S.’s frontline to box in China’s navy, with Taiwan as the critical pivot. If China breaks it, Japan, South Korea, and U.S. bases in the Pacific take the heat, while China’s trade lifelines (energy, food) get squeezed in return. Losing the chain doesn’t just cost position, it hands Beijing the region on a platter.

The U.S. plays coy with ambiguity on Taiwan, but if China lunges, the response is fierce: the U.S., Japan, Australia, South Korea, maybe NATO, lock the chain tight, carriers and subs patrol, sanctions throttle China’s oil via Malacca and its import-dependent economy (70% oil, 40% food). Taiwan’s defense secures TSMC, but the chain’s the bigger stake, its collapse unravels U.S. power, making it the linchpin of the long game.

China could turn to Russia for oil if Malacca’s choked, already getting 2.2 million barrels daily via pipelines like ESPO and overland routes, its top supplier. But China’s 15 million barrel-per-day demand dwarfs that, with 70% shipped by sea. Russia’s land routes, even at max, cover just 15-20%, and scaling up is slow, pipelines are tapped, rail’s limited, and new builds take years. Russia’s 5 million barrel export cap, split among buyers, can’t fully compensate. Sanctions or sea blockades would still cripple China’s supply, making Russia a partial lifeline, not a solution.
Honestly I don't get the Taiwan being part of the First Island strategy.

1. If Taiwan was so important to be a part of the First Island strategy, why haven't we put a base in there? We have them in South Korea, Japan, Philippines.......every other First Island except that one place, and we have had 80 years since WWII to do it.
2. One would think China had 75 years since 1949 to study this problem. I mean this Island Chain strategy is not really a secret.
3. No US carrier group sailed through the Taiwan strait in 30 years. Why is that....

Even if China's oil supply choke points like Malacca straits is closed by US Navy, what's preventing China from blockading Taiwan and negotiate a "Oil for Semiconductors" deal?

My take is that Taiwan will be returned to China just like Hong Kong was. It's already recognized as part of One China policy anyway by all parties. Given the way Ukraine was thrown under the bus recently, it might not even be that far off. Question is, how quicky can we achieve Semiconductor Independence?
 
Honestly I don't get the Taiwan being part of the First Island strategy.

1. If Taiwan was so important to be a part of the First Island strategy, why haven't we put a base in there? We have them in South Korea, Japan, Philippines.......every other First Island except that one place, and we have had 80 years since WWII to do it.
It would start a war with China.
2. One would think China had 75 years since 1949 to study this problem. I mean this Island Chain strategy is not really a secret.
3. No US carrier group sailed through the Taiwan strait in 30 years. Why is that....
Nope. Merely destroyers.
Even if China's oil supply choke points like Malacca straits is closed by US Navy, what's preventing China from blockading Taiwan and negotiate a "Oil for Semiconductors" deal?
Basic intelligence and aversion to a military action with the US, Japan, and Australia.
My take is that Taiwan will be returned to China just like Hong Kong was. It's already recognized as part of One China policy anyway by all parties. Given the way Ukraine was thrown under the bus recently, it might not even be that far off.
Not unless Taiwan wants to go willingly.
Question is, how quickly can we achieve Semiconductor Independence?
Probably a decade or more.
 
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