fansink
Well-known member
Honestly I don't get the Taiwan being part of the First Island strategy.
1. If Taiwan was so important to be a part of the First Island strategy, why haven't we put a base in there? We have them in South Korea, Japan, Philippines.......every other First Island except that one place, and we have had 80 years since WWII to do it.
2. One would think China had 75 years since 1949 to study this problem. I mean this Island Chain strategy is not really a secret.
3. No US carrier group sailed through the Taiwan strait in 30 years. Why is that....
Even if China's oil supply choke points like Malacca straits is closed by US Navy, what's preventing China from blockading Taiwan and negotiate a "Oil for Semiconductors" deal?
My take is that Taiwan will be returned to China just like Hong Kong was. It's already recognized as part of One China policy anyway by all parties. Given the way Ukraine was thrown under the bus recently, it might not even be that far off. Question is, how quicky can we achieve Semiconductor Independence?
Some light reading may paint a better picture than I'm qualified to impart:
"Tightening the Chain: Implementing a Strategy of Maritime Pressure in the Western Pacific"
Source: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), 2019
Author: Multiple contributors, led by Thomas G. Mahnken
Why It’s Authoritative: CSBA is a respected think tank focused on U.S. defense strategy, and this report directly ties the First Island Chain to countering China’s military ambitions. It proposes a “Maritime Pressure” strategy, emphasizing the chain’s role in denying China a quick win (like seizing Taiwan) by leveraging its geography for U.S. and allied forces. It’s detailed, operational, and widely cited in defense circles.
"Defend the First Island Chain"
Source: U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) Proceedings, April 2014, Vol. 140/4/1,334
Author: James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara
Why It’s Authoritative: USNI is a premier naval strategy outlet, and the authors are noted naval scholars (Holmes at Naval War College, Yoshihara a former strategist). This piece argues the chain’s islands offer a natural defensive perimeter to thwart China’s naval breakout, drawing on historical parallels like WWII. It’s concise, strategic, and influential among military planners.
"Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China"
Source: U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), 2018 (with updates in later years)
Why It’s Authoritative: This is the U.S. government’s official assessment, mandated by Congress, and it repeatedly highlights the First Island Chain as the focal point of China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. It’s dry but factual, offering unclassified insights into how the Pentagon views the chain’s role in containing China’s naval reach. The 2018 edition is foundational, though 2023-2024 updates refine the picture.
"How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense"
Source: Foreign Affairs, March/April 2015
Author: Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
Why It’s Authoritative: Foreign Affairs is a top-tier policy journal, and Krepinevich, a former CSBA president, is a heavyweight in defense strategy. This article frames the First Island Chain as the backbone of an “archipelagic defense” to deter China, blending geography, alliances, and military tech. It’s accessible yet deep, shaping broader strategic debates.