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Paul Otellini, CEO of Intel, in conversation with Berkeley-Haas Dean Rich Lyons

The Otellini quote is interesting and revealing. Even long after the event, he is either unable or unwilling to own up to a clear view of what happened and why (it was either A or B ...). And coupled with that, he doubles down on the view that history would have been significantly different had Intel built the initial Apple chips.

Looking back now, I'm far from convinced that this last view is correct. Intel might have held the line for a while. But the fundamental forces that TSMC and the fabless design ecosystem unleashed combined with the strong desire of the design ecosystem not to have Intel eating all the industry profits (as with the PC) added to the fundamental drive for low power (never an Intel strength) would surely have forced much the same eventual outcome. I think we're just arguing about the timescale and not the final result.
Intel arrogance runs deep! Can they do low power yes, but why at the time? All the money and glory came from delivering or at least appearing to deliver for x86.

Even today I suspect they are torn to delivering to intel products or the mythical whale. How with limited wafers and 20% less people do both?
 
The Otellini quote is interesting and revealing. Even long after the event, he is either unable or unwilling to own up to a clear view of what happened and why (it was either A or B ...). And coupled with that, he doubles down on the view that history would have been significantly different had Intel built the initial Apple chips.

Looking back now, I'm far from convinced that this last view is correct. Intel might have held the line for a while. But the fundamental forces that TSMC and the fabless design ecosystem unleashed combined with the strong desire of the design ecosystem not to have Intel eating all the industry profits (as with the PC) added to the fundamental drive for low power (never an Intel strength) would surely have forced much the same eventual outcome. I think we're just arguing about the timescale and not the final result.

He didn’t really care, even though he pretended to care a lot. Otherwise, as the top Intel leader, he could have said it in a straightforward way:

“We made a mistake, and our costs are too high to compete. We should not allow it to happen again.”
 
No, but perhaps it enabled TSMC to catch up. I know that ASML was very relieved that although they got the money by these three companies to do both, 450 mm development and EUV development, a pause and final silent death to 450 mm happened.

ASML's engineers had their hands full improving the source power of the EUV tool and after they bought CYMER to get this EUV source project under control, they had no desire to spend more money and engineers on 450 mm. And for ASML as tool supplier it was economically just smarter to have more 300 mm EUV tools than fewer 450 mm tools, besides all the technical issues of accelerating such huge wafer stages at incredible speeds.

There were always close ties between ASML and TSMC, they both got kick-started by Philips NL.

About ASML's Customer Co-Investment Program​

Three ASML customers - Intel, TSMC and Samsung - have agreed to contribute EUR 1.38 billion to ASML's research and development of next-generation lithography technologies over five years, specifically aimed at accelerating EUV lithography and 450mm lithography development. As part of the Customer Co-Investment Program, but separate from the R&D contribution, ASML has now received EUR 3.85 billion for issuing shares to the three participating customers. This cash will be returned to shareholders (excluding participating customers) via a Synthetic Buyback later this year, which through a reverse split will ensure that no dilution occurs from the co-investment program.
It would be a problem to emphasize the relationship between ASML and TSMC.

Of course, there was also a relationship with Intel and Samsung...

It's just that the introduction was delayed, and Intel has been doing research and development on EUV from quite early on.
 
Intel arrogance runs deep! Can they do low power yes, but why at the time? All the money and glory came from delivering or at least appearing to deliver for x86.

Even today I suspect they are torn to delivering to intel products or the mythical whale. How with limited wafers and 20% less people do both?
At least I don't think the success of x86 is a sham
 
Well, we've seen it from the days after Intel failed, so you can say whatever you like.
It can be said that it is our privilege to live in the future…
 
I'm finally getting to this.

It's interesting that Paul thought Intel would be the only compant manufacturing FinFET for about 5 years, and it turned out to be about 2 years before others got there. I am curious who he was thinking the 3rd fab player would be after 2018; he said Intel, and Samsung.. but wouldn't mention a 3rd. I guess he could have been thinking GloFo and not TSMC.

Paul did seem to (already) understand the magnitude of the mobility miss when he disucssed an entire continent (Africa) likely just bypassoing the PC revolution and going straight to mobile (for many reasons).

It was a little cringe to hear all of his examples of "career mobility" being ones about moving between bean counting, selling beans, and marketing beans.. as opposed to manufacturing and engineering beans.
 
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