You are currently viewing SemiWiki as a guest which gives you limited access to the site. To view blog comments and experience other SemiWiki features you must be a registered member. Registration is fast, simple, and absolutely free so please, join our community today!
I worked at Intel for about 15 years and I don't have time to explain why Intel failed and got into the state it is today (I am pissed off but the damage was self inflicted by Intel management & HR). If the 18A had a good yield it would have been in a totally different situation. I don't have written information but insider info since I am still connected to people working on 18A. FYI: I tested 18A SiO2 in 1993 doing photo-depopulation spectroscopy studies but unfortunately the project while successful was killed by a stupid non-technical manager as a revenge on my manager which was at the time an authority in oxide (known in the world of semi).
Curious if you would agree with my assessment posted a while back in another thread.
After asking some long time Intel folks I know I can offer three reasons that Intel R&D died under Sohail.
First, he did not demand robust processes. He was quite happy to accept a process that was held together with human glue provided by constant attention of process engineers. All that mattered is that it worked, the cost in human capital was irrelevant. This resulted in tight process windows and little time to spend on process improvement.
Second, he became a bottleneck in the development process. The story I was told is that there were so many process changes going on at once that there was very little baseline material in the factory to compare the results of the experiments against. Sohail's solution was to limit the number of changes that were allowed to run in the factory at any one time. He did this by keeping a list and reviewing each suggestion personally. If an idea didn't make the cut it didn't get on the list and didn't get run. I don't care who you are no one can be an expert in all areas of the fab. It is just too complex.
Third and I think the most important. He created an environment of fear in which people were afraid to share bad news. Everything got sugarcoated and issues were hidden. That is the kiss of death in any development process.
I was also told that Bill Holt reigned in many of Sohail's worst impulses. When Bill left Sohail was left to his own devices.
I worked at Intel for about 15 years and I don't have time to explain why Intel failed and got into the state it is today (I am pissed off but the damage was self inflicted by Intel management & HR).
You say that as if most Intel process technologies didn't have exceptional DD by product PRQ. The organization and systems did rot over the years, but the talent really did human glue some miracles until complexity and chronic underinvestment made the tasks too large to be human glued together.
That would conflict with publicly understood information. Intel 4 was clearly high yield out of the gate given how quick Xeon came and how clean the TEMs looked during teardowns. Intel claims that 18A in January was running ahead of Intel 4 in January of 2023. Which by itself doesn't garuentee anything, but it at least means Intel can't be having a Broadwell or worse yet a Cannonlake situation. Intel also shared DD for 18A last year that many quarters out from HVM put Intel at a pace somewhere between N7 and N5 (and nobody would say those processes had early yield troubles). Now if you think those black and white numerical statements on DD and how Intel 4 and 18A DD compared at the same point of time are fraudulent that is another matter. But it is hard to think multiple Intel executives would commit fraud so blatantly with statements that were known false at the time in a way that they would never be able to argue themselves out of trouble in a court of law.
FYI: I tested 18A SiO2 in 1993 doing photo-depopulation spectroscopy studies but unfortunately the project while successful was killed by a stupid non-technical manager as a revenge on my manager which was at the time an authority in oxide (known in the world of semi).
