The Wonderland of Intel Stock

[hist78]

Later today, Intel will release its Q4 2025 earnings data. With all the recent developments at Intel and across the semiconductor industry, this will be an important event for many investors and industry observers.

While Intel’s stock price has risen to $54.25 and its P/E ratio has reached a stunning 5,427 (according to marketbeat.com, or 5,113 by Google), I want to take a moment to capture some stock information for several companies, including Intel, as of the market close on 1/21/2026.

This is an exciting, remarkable, and somewhat confusing time. In the top 10 P/E ratio list, the only companies I recognized were Intel and Warby Parker (the eyeglasses company). When the famous meme stock GameStop was at its peak, its P/E ratio was “only” 736.5 in February 2024.

We all understand that the P/E ratio is calculated based on the current stock price and trailing 12‑month EPS. It may not accurately reflect a company’s true future. But Intel’s 5,427 P/E ratio does make me wonder whether the stocks of the world’s top 10 companies (by market cap) are simply too cheap to ignore.

 

[MZanny]

@Brady, I believe you might over estimates some of this forums members. ^^^

 

[Daniel Nenni]

ChatGPT Thinks Intel Stock Will Close At This Price In The Next 60 Days​

Shares of Intel have shown signs of renewed investor interest as the company's push to ramp semiconductor production and expand its AI foundry ambitions intersects with broader demand for compute and deeper strategic positioning versus rivals like Nvidia and TSMC.

Against that backdrop, we ran Intel through an AI price-prediction agent powered by OpenAI's GPT. The goal was to produce a 60-day forecast that blends recent price action, technical indicators, and the evolving story around production scaling, AI contracts, and competitive positioning.

What the AI model is actually predicting​

The agent was fed recent price action and a focused set of inputs to produce a 60-day outlook. At the time of the run, Intel traded at $54.25. For the period through April 16, the model's base-case projection came out to:

• Average predicted price: $58.50
• Implied move: roughly +7.83% into mid-April
• Signal snapshot: MACD drops sharply and RSI declines, signaling waning short-term momentum even as broader demand drivers persist

In practical terms, the AI is saying the most likely path over the next two months is a move upward from current levels, despite technical indicators that have softened.

Intel's resurgence narrative centers on a production ramp at advanced nodes (18A/18A-class technology) and a growing footprint in AI workloads and infrastructure contracts. While TSMC still dominates the pure-play foundry landscape, Intel's fabs, including its Arizona facilities, are now producing volume at competitive process classes, positioning the company as a potential alternative for customers seeking geographically diversified supply.

That foundry strategy comes with challenges, but also margin expansion opportunities. Intel has reorganized its financial reporting to highlight the foundry operating model and set long-term targets for improved gross and operating margins as scale and efficiency improve.

Enterprise demand for compute and AI integration, especially for data centers and custom accelerators, further underpins the narrative. Intel's ramp of Panther Lake processors and AI-optimized products, coupled with expanding partnerships and production capacity, supports the view that demand tied to AI workloads can translate to real revenue growth and improved utilization of Intel's manufacturing assets.

Price action in recent weeks reflects this mix of optimism and caution. Technical indicators like MACD and RSI are soft, suggesting short-term selling pressure or consolidation, but broader structural stories around production scale, AI contract flows, and foundry progress temper outright bearishness.

Think of this AI outlook as a 60-day temperature check.​

The model isn't delivering a long-term verdict on whether Intel will unseat competitors like TSMC or meaningfully close the gap with Nvidia in AI silicon. Instead, it's estimating how the stock may trade while investors parse execution progress, production ramp milestones, and emerging AI demand signals. In this run, the agent tilts slightly positive, a modest rise into mid-April, even as momentum indicators soften.

For longer-term investors focused on Intel's foundry strategy and AI production contracts, this forecast suggests steady support for the narrative, though near-term volatility could persist. For traders, it's a reminder that the next significant move in Intel will likely hinge on fresh catalysts such as clearer visibility into node yields, major foundry customer wins, or updated guidance tied to execution milestones.

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/chatgpt-thinks-intel-stock-close-153120913.html?fr=sycsrp_catchall

 

[Daniel Nenni]

When Lip-Bu Tan personally bought ~$25 million of Intel stock as part of his CEO compensation agreement, the average price per share he paid was about ~$23.96 per share. Not a bad profit for 10 months. Not to mention his stock options award as the new CEO:

• New-hire stock option grant: ~$25 million
• Additional stock option package: ~$9.6 million
• Performance stock units and equity awards: ~$31.4 million (includes performance and long-term grant values)

 

[Erik F]

People are bullish on Bullish.

 

[Erik F]

and also chip shortages

 

[MKWVentures]

Actually Intel EPS is negative. It is only positive if we use Generally unaccepted accounting principles. P/E is infinite.
At least Intel IFS external sales went up ... because Altera is now considered an external customer LOL.

 

[hist78]

Actually Intel EPS is negative. It is only positive if we use Generally unaccepted accounting principles. P/E is infinite.
At least Intel IFS external sales went up ... because Altera is now considered an external customer LOL.

Up until January 21, 2026, Intel’s trailing twelve‑month (TTM) EPS was about $0.01. That’s why Intel’s P/E ratio reached a stunning 5,427 (according to MarketBeat) or 5,113 (per Google) yesterday. With the newly released Q4 2025 earnings today, Intel’s full year 2025 EPS has dropped to –$0.08 or -$0.06 (per Intel's press release today). As a result, the P/E ratio for Intel has effectively become meaningless. All figures in my analysis are based on GAAP reporting.

 

[tomatoma]

Fab should be abandoned

 

[MKWVentures]

How does intel shrink, get constrained, and lower product margins in this environment?

IMO not a good con call for LBT. Bad news, no positive numbers, cheerleader comments, Panther lake hurting margins.

Lets see the 10K

 

[hist78]

How does intel shrink, get constrained, and lower product margins in this environment?

IMO not a good con call for LBT. Bad news, no positive numbers, cheerleader comments, Panther lake hurting margins.

Lets see the 10K

It doesn’t sound right. From 2020 to 2024, Intel spent about $109 billion in Capex to build capacity. How could Intel’s revenue shrink or remain flat in such a red-hot market while blaming substrates and memory shortages? Many of Intel’s peers faced the same supply chain issues, so why were they able to grow revenue and profits significantly?

Intel is not a humble startup. It is a big company with $52.9 billion in annual revenue. It just doesn’t add up.

 

[MKWVentures]

It doesn’t sound right. From 2020 to 2024, Intel spent about $109 billion in Capex to build capacity. How could Intel’s revenue shrink or remain flat in such a red-hot market while blaming substrates and memory shortages? Many of Intel’s peers faced the same supply chain issues, so why were they able to grow revenue and profits significantly?

Intel is not a humble startup. It is a big company with $52.9 billion in annual revenue. It just doesn’t add up.

Intel is constrained while shrinking.... let that set in. and he said its not related to DRAM

SIde note: according to Intel, 10% of Intel output is EUV. 10%. My pessimistic model was 17%. apparently Ireland is not fully tooled out. Fab 52 is not fully tooled out.

Intel said they 18A and Panther lake delivered ahead of schedule. This is obviously not true. Then DZ said Panther Lake launched in 2025. It did not. The analysts all know this and have reported on this. Is he channeling Pat???

It sounds like the limiter is not TSMC (he wants to trade off CCG to DCAI from Intel Fabs). Then he talks about buying tools for Intel 10 and Intel 7 and ramping starts.

One of the analysts (Stacy Rasgon) was hammering them "you have your own fabs... how does this happen????" (I didnt prompt him to do that. LOL)

I am surprised. I Need to get info on how this happened.

Lets see what AMD does.

 

[hist78]

Intel is constrained while shrinking.... let that set in. and he said its not related to DRAM

SIde note: according to Intel, 10% of Intel output is EUV. 10%. My pessimistic model was 17%. apparently Ireland is not fully tooled out. Fab 52 is not fully tooled out.

Intel said they 18A and Panther lake delivered ahead of schedule. This is obviously not true. Then DZ said Panther Lake launched in 2025. It did not. The analysts all know this and have reported on this. Is he channeling Pat???

It sounds like the limiter is not TSMC (he wants to trade off CCG to DCAI from Intel Fabs). Then he talks about buying tools for Intel 10 and Intel 7 and ramping starts.

One of the analysts (Stacy Rasgon) was hammering them "you have your own fabs... how does this happen????" (I didnt prompt him to do that. LOL)

I am surprised. I Need to get info on how this happened.

Lets see what AMD does.

" "you have your own fabs... how does this happen????" (I didnt prompt him to do that. LOL)".

We are often told that Intel’s IDM model has the advantage of responding quickly to market demand because Intel owns its fabs. Yet now Intel Foundry cannot even satisfy Intel’s own internal demand when external customers want to buy Intel products. Isn’t that strange?

With revenue essentially flat from 2024 to 2025, what went wrong after spending $109 billion in Capex between 2020 and 2024?

 

[lispwright]

We are often told that Intel’s IDM model has the advantage of responding quickly to market demand because Intel owns its fabs.

That bears on our current discussion (you and myself, I'm working on an effort post when I have time), of "Is the IDM model fatal?" including through encouraging bad management, or "Is Intel's culture enough to explain their fate?"

So I say here, just because Intel can respond quickly doesn't mean they will. If you require 12 or more steppings, 5 base, to get an HPC CPU out the door you have severe problems that aren't foundry related. Unless of course some of them were from Intel Foundry lying about the state of 10 nm as they have reported to have done for a couple of years. I think the later sets of steppings argue that was not all of it.

Yet now Intel Foundry cannot even satisfy Intel’s own internal demand when external customers want to buy Intel products.

Which products are those?

Except for your above claim, in this subthread I'd be arguing Intel missing out on a hot market was not having enough of what customers want today. I'd wonder about Intel vs. AMD in basic x86 server CPUs, but obviously they had no worthy AI story, and Lip-Bu Tan has admitted they've lost the training market. Even when they tend to have better software and firmware than AMD. And:

With revenue essentially flat from 2024 to 2025, what went wrong after spending $109 billion in Capex between 2020 and 2024?

I'd argue about 18A getting no whales. Although what have I been reading elsewhere in a few places about an Apple-Intel deal to do M chips if I remember correctly, on 18A? False rumor?

 

[siliconbruh999]

So I say here, just because Intel can respond quickly doesn't mean they will. If you require 12 or more steppings, 5 base, to get an HPC CPU out the door you have severe problems that aren't foundry related. Unless of course some of them were from Intel Foundry lying about the state of 10 nm as they have reported to have done for a couple of years. I think the later sets of steppings argue that was not all of it.

If you are taking about SPR it was a design issue 10nm didn't have any issues after TGL ramp so like end of 20 start of 21 Intel 10nm was fine SPR launched Q1 23.
Apparently there were firing of validation team for SPR that caused part of delay.

I'd argue about 18A getting no whales. Although what have I been reading elsewhere in a few places about an Apple-Intel deal to do M chips if I remember correctly, on 18A? False rumor?

Yeah but Where is Intel 3 in Volume GNR is fine product but the ramp is slow it's nearly 15 months since launch

 

[bilau]

With revenue essentially flat from 2024 to 2025, what went wrong after spending $109 billion in Capex between 2020 and 2024?

Well, they admitted that their yield sucks.

But there are always two sides to every story: they now have a lot of room to grow supply without much additional capex!!

 

[MKWVentures]

Well, they admitted that their yield sucks.

But there are always two sides to every story: they now have a lot of room to grow supply without much additional capex!!

They are short on Intel 7 somehow, which actually has very good yields. Only 10% of their output is EUV.

 

[hist78]

Well, they admitted that their yield sucks.

But there are always two sides to every story: they now have a lot of room to grow supply without much additional capex!!

Yes, yield is definitely a major factor behind Intel’s poor performance in such a booming market. But it cannot explain the entire situation, especially on the revenue side.

Intel 18A only entered high volume manufacturing (HVM) in the fourth quarter of 2025, and OEM laptop PCs using 18A will not appear until the first quarter of 2026. The impact of Intel 18A on Intel’s 2025 revenue and profit should therefore be limited. Intel’s 2025 financial results are still driven by products manufactured on Intel 7, Intel 4, Intel 3, and by outsourced production at TSMC.

Intel Manufacturing Nodes HVM Timeline:

Intel 7: 2021 (Alder Lake)
Intel 4: 2023 (Meteor Lake)
Intel 3: 2023 (Xeon 6)

Are we saying that the yields for Intel 7, 4, and/or 3 are also poor? It’s hard to believe that, after so much time in high volume manufacturing, these nodes would still be struggling with yield issues.

Or perhaps there are additional factors:

1. Customers may be buying fewer Intel products due to performance, features, pricing, operating costs, value, delivery time, or in‑house alternatives.

2. Intel’s cost structure may simply be too high. The more Intel Foundry Services produces, the more losses it incurs, which could force Intel to limit production instead of losing more money.

3. From 2020 to 2024, Intel spent roughly $109 billion in CapEx. Did Intel allocate that money to the wrong areas?

 

[Erik F]

Yes, yield is definitely a major factor behind Intel’s poor performance in such a booming market. But it cannot explain the entire situation, especially on the revenue side.

Intel 18A only entered high volume manufacturing (HVM) in the fourth quarter of 2025, and OEM laptop PCs using 18A will not appear until the first quarter of 2026. The impact of Intel 18A on Intel’s 2025 revenue and profit should therefore be limited. Intel’s 2025 financial results are still driven by products manufactured on Intel 7, Intel 4, Intel 3, and by outsourced production at TSMC.

Intel Manufacturing Nodes HVM Timeline:

Intel 7: 2021 (Alder Lake)
Intel 4: 2023 (Meteor Lake)
Intel 3: 2023 (Xeon 6)

Are we saying that the yields for Intel 7, 4, and/or 3 are also poor? It’s hard to believe that, after so much time in high volume manufacturing, these nodes would still be struggling with yield issues.

Or perhaps there are additional factors:

1. Customers may be buying fewer Intel products due to performance, features, pricing, operating costs, value, delivery time, or in‑house alternatives.

2. Intel’s cost structure may simply be too high. The more Intel Foundry Services produces, the more losses it incurs, which could force Intel to limit production instead of losing more money.

3. From 2020 to 2024, Intel spent roughly $109 billion in CapEx. Did Intel allocate that money to the wrong areas?

1. DC was up, and given they cannibalized ccg, I don't think that is the case, they had nothing to sell even with clients wanting to buy
2. Most of the increase would have been in DC which presumably has higher margins, unless they really do suck.
3. Imagine spending 100 billion and when demand finnaly shows up you have nothing to show, how can someone like LBT that claims to be in constant contat with customers miss this?

 

[dkr1986]

They are short on Intel 7 somehow, which actually has very good yields.

That is because they took down Intel 7 capacity in Q3'24 to upgrade Fab 42 to support 18A (that upgrade I know didn't materialize under the Interim CO-CEO & new CEO). Intel 3 is capacity constrained because Lip Bu does not want to spend the necessary capex to add capacity without seeing demand increasing. It increased now out of nowhere, but it takes a while from ordering tools to installing tools to produce wafers. Explains the current predicament of Intel's capacity constraints. And I bet even Fab 52 is only partially tooled to save cost on the ramp of 18A. So even if CWF launched in 1Q'26, it will be capacity constrained for couple of Qtrs due to this.

"We will only build capacity if customer shows up" works for onboarding new foundry customers as they will commit at least 1 to 1.5 years ahead enough time to tool out & ramp a fab but that strategy does not work for sudden increase in demand like we are seeing for server CPUs now. It also does not work if there is no physical fab space (you know, the one that take 3+ years to build).

Only 10% of their output is EUV.

It kind of makes sense as most of their Intel 3 (same fab line as Intel 4 I suppose) is dedicated to GNR & SRF (also base die for CWF) which is large die size and low volume. So, on wafer volume basis EUV usage is still low, but it doubled from last year and so I guess we can expect it to more than double next year (Fab 34 only in 2025 vs Fab 34 & Fab 52 in 2026). On one hand Bob Swan's plan to outsource to TSMC bought them valuable time to tread water on Intel Product side while on the other hand it also is destroying the fab economics on the foundry side.