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China expands rare earths restrictions, targets defense and chips users

Fred Chen

Moderator
BEIJING, Oct 9 (Reuters) - China dramatically expanded its rare earths export controls on Thursday, adding five new elements and extra scrutiny for semiconductor users as Beijing tightens control over the sector ahead of talks between Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping.

The world's largest rare earths producer also added dozens of pieces of refining technology to its control list and announced rules that will require compliance from foreign rare earth producers who use Chinese materials.

The Ministry of Commerce's announcements follow U.S. lawmakers' call on Tuesday for broader bans on the export of chipmaking equipment to China.

They expand controls Beijing announced in April that caused shortages around the world, before a series of deals with Europe and the U.S. eased the supply crunch.

"The White House and relevant agencies are closely assessing any impact from the new rules, which were announced without any notice and imposed in an apparent effort to exert control over the entire world's technology supply chains," a White House official told Reuters on Thursday.

The new curbs come ahead of a scheduled face-to-face meeting between Trump and Xi in South Korea at the end of October.

"This helps with increasing leverage for Beijing ahead of the anticipated Trump-Xi summit in (South) Korea later this month," said Tim Zhang, founder of Singapore-based Edge Research.

China produces over 90% of the world's processed rare earths and rare earth magnets. The 17 rare earths are vital materials in products ranging from electric vehicles to aircraft engines and military radars.

Exports of 12 of them are now restricted after the ministry added five - holmium, erbium, thulium, europium and ytterbium - along with related materials.

Foreign companies producing some of the rare earths and related magnets on the list will now also need a Chinese export licence if the final product contains or is made with Chinese equipment or material. This applies even if the transaction includes no Chinese companies.

The regulations mimic rules the U.S. has implemented to restrict other countries' exports of semiconductor-related products to China.

It was not immediately clear how Beijing intends to enforce its new regime, especially as the U.S., the European Union and others race to build alternatives, opens new tab to the Chinese rare earth supply chain.

"We're likely entering a period of structural bifurcation — with China localizing its value chain and the U.S. and allies accelerating their own," said Neha Mukherjee, a rare earths analyst with Benchmark Mineral Intelligence.

In a nod to concerns about supply shortages, the ministry said the scope of items in its latest restrictions was limited and "a variety of licensing facilitation measures will be adopted".

China's latest restrictions on the five additional elements and processing equipment will take effect on November 8, just before a 90-day trade truce with Washington expires.

The rules on foreign companies that make products using Chinese rare earths equipment or material are to take effect on December 1. Shares in China Northern Rare Earth Group (600111.SS), China Rare Earth Resources and Technology (000831.SZ) and Shenghe Resources (600392.SS) surged by 10%, 9.97% and 9.4%, respectively, on Thursday.

Shares in U.S.-based rare earths companies jumped as well in New York afternoon trading, with Critical Metals Corp (CRML.O) gaining 25%, Energy Fuels (UUUU.A) adding 9%, MP Materials (MP.N) gaining 2.5% and USA Rare Earth (USAR.O) up 15%.

Energy Fuels, which owns a uranium and rare earths processing facility in Utah, said in a statement to Reuters that it is working to boost U.S. rare earths production and that its recent pilot project "showcases the technical capabilities of an American company on American soil."

NioCorp (NB.O), which is developing a Nebraska rare earths mine, said: "It's clear that the People's Liberation Army is increasingly calling the shots on rare earth policy in China. That means even more difficult times both for the Pentagon and for a wide range of commercial manufacturers."

CHIPS AND DEFENSE​

The ministry also said overseas defense users will not be granted licences, while applications related to advanced semiconductors will be approved on a case-by-case basis.

The new rules apply to 14-nanometer chips or more advanced chips, memory chips with 256 layers or more, and equipment used in production of such chips, as well as to related research and development. These advanced chips are used in products from smartphones to AI chipsets that require powerful computing performance.

The rules will also apply to research and development of artificial intelligence with potential military applications.

South Korea, home to major memory chipmakers Samsung Electronics (005930.KS) and SK Hynix (000660.KS), is assessing the details of the new restrictions and will continue discussions with China to minimise their impact, its industry ministry said in a statement to Reuters.

Samsung declined to comment. SK Hynix and Taiwan's TSMC (2330.TW) did not immediately respond to questions.

Shares in TSMC rose 1.8% on Thursday, as the company reported forecast-beating third-quarter revenue. South Korea's financial markets were closed on Thursday for a public holiday.

Reporting by Beijing bureau; Additional reporting by Ernest Scheyder in Houston, Heekyong Yang in Seoul, Eric Onstad in London and Jarrett Renshaw in Washington; Editing by Christian Schmollinger, Kate Mayberry, Tom Hogue, Mark Heinrich, Jason Neely and Marguerita Choy

 
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Why doesnt Trump open up a few processing plants in the Red States?

Existing and Planned Facilities​

  • Trump's strategy emphasizes public-private deals to de-risk investments, focusing on hubs in states like Texas and Oklahoma. Key developments:
    • Texas: MP Materials' $58.5 million magnet plant in Fort Worth (ramping to 1,000 tons/year by 2026) received a Pentagon $150 million loan and decade-long price floor guarantee in August 2025. Noveon Magnetics operates the U.S.'s only active REE magnet factory in San Marcos, with expansions funded by DPA awards. Lynas USA is building light REE separation in Hondo and heavy REE processing in Seadrift—Texas now hosts ~$439 million in DOD-backed midstream projects since 2020.
    • Oklahoma: USA Rare Earth is developing a 310,000 sq ft magnet facility in Stillwater, tied to its Sierra Blanca, TX mine. CEO Pini Althaus confirmed October 2025 talks with Trump's team for similar stakes, building on a 5% government equity in Lithium Americas.
    • California: MP's Mountain Pass mine (only U.S. REE mine) added $35 million in 2022 for heavy REE separation, aiming for full integration by late 2025—but output will still be <1% of China's 138,000 tons/year.
    • Other Sites: Phoenix Tailings' New Hampshire facility and Vulcan Elements' pilot in (undisclosed U.S. site) got July 2025 nods from trade advisor Peter Navarro. Internationally, Trump eyes stakes in Greenland's Tanbreez project via Critical Metals Corp for U.S. processing.

  • These could triple U.S. capacity by 2030, per CSIS, but full plants take 3–5 years. Trump's July 24, 2025, meeting with Apple, Microsoft, and REE firms stressed "Warp Speed"-like acceleration. Nice Star Trek Reference for us boomers.
 
Was that plan to cut (or at least undermine) the middle-man (middle-kingdom) in supply chain?
Pakistan has sent its first-ever shipment of rare earth elements and critical minerals to the United States under a landmark $500 million agreement with U.S. Strategic Metals (USSM).

The shipment marks the implementation of two Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) signed on September 8, 2025, in the presence of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and senior U.S. and Pakistani officials.

According to the agreement, Pakistan will export minerals including antimony, copper concentrate, and rare earth elements such as neodymium and praseodymium. The partnership focuses on developing the complete mineral value chain, from exploration and beneficiation to concentrate production and future refinery construction.

Officials stated that the collaboration aims to promote technology transfer, job creation, and industrial development within Pakistan’s mining sector. For the United States, the arrangement supports its goal of diversifying global supply chains for critical minerals essential to defense and clean energy industries.

This initiative is viewed as a milestone in Pakistan’s efforts to enter the global rare earth market and strengthen bilateral economic ties with the United States.

AI summary. Tldr: there is growing frustration with Chinese neo-imperialism in developing countries.

China‑Pakistan Infrastructure / BRI / CPEC​


  • CPEC (China‑Pakistan Economic Corridor) remains central to the China‑Pakistan tie: rail, port (Gwadar), highways, power plants, special economic zones etc. (Dawn)
  • China and Pakistan recently agreed to upgrade Pakistan’s railways and further develop Gwadar port; Chinese investment invited in offshore oil & gas. (Reuters)
  • Gwadar has seen significant infrastructure: new airport (New Gwadar International Airport, opened ~2024‑2025) largely funded/granted by China. (Wikipedia)



Security Issues & Local Push‑back​


  • There is rising resistance / resentment among local populations in parts of Balochistan (and also Gilgit‑Baltistan) over how the Chinese projects have affected their livelihoods, mobility, access to resources, and whether the benefits actually reach locals. (Profit by Pakistan Today)
    • For example, fishers in Gwadar say their access to the sea is severely restricted; boats raided; locals say the sea now feels like it belongs to Chinese interests. (Profit by Pakistan Today)
    • The security situation (checkpoints, militarization, restricted zones) has also heightened the feeling among locals that the projects serve Chinese/central interests more than local people. (Profit by Pakistan Today)
  • There have been multiple terrorist / militant attacks targeting Chinese nationals or infrastructure:
    • The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has claimed / conducted attacks, including on Gwadar, Gwadar port’s complex, etc. (Reuters)
    • The “Shangla bombing” in March 2024 targeted a bus carrying Chinese engineers. (Wikipedia)
    • The “Dasu bus attack” (2021) killed several Chinese citizens. (Wikipedia)
  • In response, Pakistan has launched military / security operations especially in Balochistan, and pledged to improve security of Chinese personnel and installations. (Business Standard)



Rare Earths / Critical Minerals: New Dynamics​


  • Pakistan has identified significant mineral potential: more than 90 types of minerals and rare earths among them. (asiasentinel.com)
  • Pakistan recently signed MoUs with US Strategic Metals (USSM) (around September 2025) to develop its rare earth / critical minerals sector. This covers exploration, processing, potentially building refineries, exporting some critical minerals. (Asia Times)
  • The first batch of rare earth / critical mineral shipments from Pakistan to the U.S. has taken place: includes antimony, copper concentrate, neodymium, praseodymium etc. (Marine Insight)
  • China has recently tightened export controls on rare earth extraction / separation technologies, synthetic diamond powders etc., including restricting some exports of middle/heavy rare earths, alloys etc. (Profit by Pakistan Today)
  • There have been reports speculating that these Chinese export control moves are tied to Pakistan’s cooperation or shipments to the U.S. But China officially denies a causal link, saying such reports are speculative or misinformed. (Aaj English TV)

So while Pakistan is indeed moving to develop more direct value in mining/processing of rare earths / critical minerals, it is not clear that China is “cutting Pakistan out,” nor that Pakistan has decisively shifted away from China. The situation is still evolving, and there are diplomatic tensions related to how far Pakistan goes in dealing with the U.S.




Immigration / Chinese Nationals in Pakistan​


  • There has been a significant number of Chinese nationals working/arriving in Pakistan tied to infrastructure projects, businesses etc. (The Express Tribune)
  • Security is a major concern for them; many Chinese staff work in guarded compounds, have restricted movement, require police or security escorts. (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre)
  • In some cases, authorities have instructed Chinese engineers to limit movement outside project camps, use armoured transport etc. (Dawn)
  • There is no major reporting of large‐scale immigration of Chinese non‑project workers or families, but visa policies have had some changes (e.g. proposals/confirmations for visa‑free business travel for Chinese passport holders). (EY)



Border Skirmishes / Afghanistan / Regional Ambitions​


  • Recent weeks/days: Pakistan has clashed with Afghan forces, accusing Afghanistan of harboring Tehreek‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants. Pakistan also claims India is backing some militant / proxy operations. Skirmishes have resulted in casualties on both sides. (AP News)
  • Pakistan has closed border crossings (Torkham, Chaman etc.) following the clashes. (Reuters)
  • Pakistan frames these border incidents as retaliation for TTP attacks and demands that Afghanistan take action against militant safe havens. Kabul denies or disputes some of these claims. (AP News)
  • On ambitions: Pakistan is expressing (at least rhetorically / aspirationally) a desire to become more of a regional power, especially given Iran’s decreasing regional role (due to sanctions etc.), and Pakistan sees opportunities in its geographic location, mineral wealth, and leveraging great power competition. Also, the mineral strategy (rare earths etc.) is part of Pakistan’s attempt to “rise up” in global supply chains. (asiasentinel.com)



Pakistani Stance / Balancing Acts​


  • Pakistan continues to court Chinese investment and sees China as a vital economic partner. Even with local tensions, Pakistan leadership has reiterated the importance of CPEC, Gwadar, etc. (Reuters)
  • At the same time, Pakistan is trying to diversify: via rare earth / critical minerals partnership with the U.S., opening up to foreign mining investment, expressing desire to become “global mineral powerhouse.” (asiasentinel.com)
  • In rare earth context, Pakistan has been careful to assert that its deals with the U.S. will not harm its relations with China. China has also publicly stated that its recent rare earth export controls are not targeting Pakistan, and that its partnership with Pakistan remains strong. (Aaj English TV)



Current Situation & Potential Outcomes​


  • Pakistan seems to be in a transitional phase: moving from being mostly a host to Chinese‐led infrastructure investment, to trying to harness its own mineral and resource endowments for more value, possibly engaging more with western or third‑party actors (e.g. U.S.) in order to get better returns and less dependency.
  • The rare earth / mineral shipments to the U.S. could be part of that shift. This might produce pressure from China (which dominates many stages of extraction/processing globally) to tighten controls, to prevent technology leakage, loss of leverage etc. We already see China doing just that with export control measures. (Profit by Pakistan Today)
  • Local unrest / militant attacks remain a serious risk, especially in Balochistan. If security deteriorates, Chinese investment may slow; costs will increase. Pakistan needs to maintain security for Chinese nationals/projects while trying to show benefits to local communities.
  • Border tensions with Afghanistan (and by extension, involvement with the Taliban / TTP) may distract, or require Pakistan to devote more resources to internal security rather than only infrastructure/mineral development.
  • The visa / immigration side seems less of a flashpoint than security, economic outcomes, and foreign policy.



What is​


  • It is not confirmed whether Pakistan is “cutting China out” in some big way. The rare earth deals with the U.S. appear complementary, but China officially says it is not being undermined. This suggests that Pakistan is not yet adversarial with China but trying to hedge.
  • The exact scale of rare earth reserves in Pakistan, their viability for large‑scale extraction, processing, refining, and export is still uncertain. Mining & value chain infrastructure is expensive, requires stable security, reliable regulation.
  • Whether Pakistan can maintain balancing act between China and U.S./West without provoking Chinese displeasure is an open question.



Summary View​


To sum up:


  • China remains deeply embedded in Pakistan via infrastructure, investment (Gwadar, ports, roads, power, etc.).
  • Pakistan is experiencing increasing stress: local resentment, militant attacks, security demands, and criticisms of unequal benefit sharing.
  • Rare earths / critical minerals are becoming a strategic lever: Pakistan is seeking to boost its own extraction and exports directly, including to the U.S., rather than being just a passive partner.
  • China has responded by tightening export/tech control measures around rare earths to protect its position.
  • Pakistan is attempting to balance: maintain China relations, get Chinese investment, but also diversify its partners (e.g. with U.S.), and capitalize on its resource base to assert more agency.
  • Border and regional security issues (especially with Afghanistan / TTP) remain major wildcards that affect both domestic stability and Pakistan’s ability to execute its ambitions.



If you like, I can sketch potential scenarios (best case, worst case) for how this could evolve over the next few years.
 
California: MP's Mountain Pass mine (only U.S. REE mine) added $35 million in 2022 for heavy REE separation, aiming for full integration by late 2025—but output will still be <1% of China's 138,000 tons/year.
The US does not need to approach China's output. Given the dirtiness of the mining and refining processes, which you have pointed out, it is very difficult to believe the US will ever be an significant exporter of rare earths. More likely, if the US executes on a capacity building strategy, the most we will achieve is enough to cover defense company and critical industries' needs. I also suspect we'll be building a stockpile comparable to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
 
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