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The Day Huawei’s CEO Bent the Knee in a Santa Clara Marriott

Daniel Nenni

Admin
Staff member
Huawei vs PMC.jpg



View Haresh Patel’s  graphic link

Haresh PatelHaresh Patel
https://hareshpatel.ai/
It was 1998, and I was VP of Worldwide Sales at PMC-Sierra during the dot-com boom. We were Wall Street’s darling, building the semiconductors that powered the internet’s backbone. Our chips were the brains behind the routers connecting the world.
But there was one market we refused to touch: China.

“They’ll steal everything we’ve built.” The executive team feared IP theft and reverse engineering. But I watched Huawei and ZTE grow at a blistering pace. I knew we were missing the opportunity of a lifetime.

After months of fighting, I convinced Bob, our CEO, to let me build a China sales team.

We penetrated deep into both Huawei and ZTE. Our semiconductors became the brain of their routers. While the old guard designed technology with thousands of engineers over years, Huawei and Cisco used our chips with hundreds of engineers and brought routers to market in months. They moved at internet speed while dinosaurs sat in committee meetings.

Revenue was pouring in.

Then the whispers started: Huawei was reverse engineering our technology.

Bob pulled me aside. “Find out what’s happening.”

What we uncovered wasn’t courtroom-ready, but damning enough. We decided fast.

I drafted a letter to Huawei’s CEO: We were stopping all chip sales immediately. Since we were their sole source, we’d shut down their growth overnight. No chips, no routers. No routers, no revenue.

The response came within hours.

Their CEO personally flew to California for an emergency meeting.

We met at the Santa Clara Marriott. Neutral ground where billion-dollar relationships get made or broken.

Myself, Bob, my sales manager Tony, and Huawei’s CEO sat across a conference table. His opening was textbook: chips were too expensive, no motivation to steal. We both knew the stakes. They needed us far more than we needed them.

We hammered out a minor price concession. They signed a memorandum immediately ceasing any reverse engineering.
No lawyers. No legal review. No weeks of back-and-forth.

We drafted it in that conference room. Both parties signed, shook hands, walked out. One afternoon. Old-school dealmaking.
We continued selling tens of millions for several years. Eventually, they replaced our technology—inevitable. The question was whether we’d capture the growth phase or watch from the sidelines.

But here’s the real victory: Nortel, Ericsson, Nokia—getting clobbered by Huawei and Cisco’s speed—finally abandoned their “not invented here” mentality and started using our chips.
We won both sides of the war.

The lesson wasn’t about IP protection or China strategy. It was about leverage, timing, and courage to make bold moves when you hold the cards. We could have lawyered up and spent years in litigation. Instead, we sat their CEO in a Marriott and reminded him we were the sole source powering his rise.

Sometimes the most powerful negotiation happens when you’re willing to walk away entirely, and making someone fly 6,000 miles.
 
WT...

What was the moral of the story again? Was it that if you are the sole source, you have power and can bend or break knees?

Anyway, it is good to hear personal triumphs, thank you Daniel for this very uplifting article!
 
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In software you could tell when the derivative code had the same bugs as the original. With chips, it doesn't seem practical to actually steal the logic.
While the latter is true with most of today's chips, old hands here recall the days of painstaking layer removal and photomicrography (?). I could still see that happening for some large featured designs (analog?)
 
While the latter is true with most of today's chips, old hands here recall the days of painstaking layer removal and photomicrography (?). I could still see that happening for some large featured designs (analog?)
Yeah, I know. I wasn't into chip design back then, but I heard about looking at circuits through microscopes. I was referring to just modern (post 2010) logic chips. :)
 
WT...

What was the moral of the story again? Was it that if you are the sole source, you have power and can bend or break knees?

Anyway, it is good to hear personal triumphs, thank you Daniel for this very uplifting article!

This story played out many times in the semiconductor ecosystem. I know Haresh. Everyone feared China was copying, reverse engineering, general thievery and they were. For EDA it was license hacking and copying. The joke was selling one license to China was like selling unlimited licenses.

EDA worked together with the Chinese government to limit copying and the result was billions of dollars in EDA revenue over the last 20 years. Of course that was all negated by the US government banning EDA sales to China early this year so many more billions of dollars of revenue will be lost.

The moral of the story is that open markets and innovation is the best business strategy. What we are doing today, not so much.
 
This story played out many times in the semiconductor ecosystem. I know Haresh. Everyone feared China was copying, reverse engineering, general thievery and they were. For EDA it was license hacking and copying. The joke was selling one license to China was like selling unlimited licenses.

EDA worked together with the Chinese government to limit copying and the result was billions of dollars in EDA revenue over the last 20 years. Of course that was all negated by the US government banning EDA sales to China early this year so many more billions of dollars of revenue will be lost.

The moral of the story is that open markets and innovation is the best business strategy. What we are doing today not so much.
Chinese government only more seriously looking into IP issue when they are trying to get internal industry going. This is probably not unique to China
 
Chinese government only more seriously looking into IP issue when they are trying to get internal industry going. This is probably not unique to China

It is not unique to China. I ran foundry relations for an SRAM IP company for a few years. Foundries in Korea and China did try and replicate our memory compilers but were consistently 2-3 generations behind us which is why I said innovate. If you are running at full speed while looking over your shoulder you will hit a brick wall at some point in time.

This is one of the reasons why TSMC has such a strong IP ecosystem. They port/license the latest and greatest technology through close partnerships rather than steal IP. It is a winning formula and a big difference between China and Taiwan business culture. Just my personal experience of course.
 
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