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Intel to Repurchase 49% Equity Interest in Ireland Fab Joint Venture

I have a pretty good model for 18A wafer cost today and what it will be when fully loaded in Fab 52.
Curious, does your model show 18A is cost competitive when F52 is fully ramped? And what is your yield assumption when 18A is mature?

I'm assuming this is not based on a final product since that involves chips from multiple processes/vendors.
 
Well you are only thinking it from one point of view it is possible don't forget there is profit sharing as well for the fab Intel already paid a decent amount of fine for Ireland already if they failed to meet another milestone they had to pay the fine on top of sharing the profit and Intel might have factored that in when making the purchase.

Isn’t what you described just one of the reasons that Intel is being forced to buy back the 49% stake in the joint venture at such a high price and poor timing when Intel needs more cash? Especially since it effectively wipes out almost all of the cash investments made by the U.S. government, Nvidia, and SoftBank.

This $14.2 billion cash outflow exceeds the total net profit Intel has earned over the past five years. By comparison, Intel’s 2025 CapEx is $14.65 billion, only slightly higher than the $14.2 billion payout to Apollo.

This JV buyback will allow Intel to manage its Ireland fab with greater flexibility. But, the financial strain on Intel is enormous. Intel must be under significant pressure to execute such a large buyback, one that does not increase fab capacity at all.

"Are we really sure Intel initiated this “joint venture” buyback? Or was Intel forced to buy back Apollo’s 49% stake because the JV contract entitled Apollo to a highly profitable exit once certain clauses were met, or not met?"

 
Isn’t what you described just one of the reasons that Intel is being forced to buy back the 49% stake in the joint venture at such a high price and poor timing when Intel needs more cash? Especially since it effectively wipes out almost all of the cash investments made by the U.S. government, Nvidia, and SoftBank.
Can't say about poor timing though cause the fab is decent bit old now it might have out of being costly phase
 
Isn’t what you described just one of the reasons that Intel is being forced to buy back the 49% stake in the joint venture at such a high price and poor timing when Intel needs more cash? Especially since it effectively wipes out almost all of the cash investments made by the U.S. government, Nvidia, and SoftBank.

This $14.2 billion cash outflow exceeds the total net profit Intel has earned over the past five years. By comparison, Intel’s 2025 CapEx is $14.65 billion, only slightly higher than the $14.2 billion payout to Apollo.

This JV buyback will allow Intel to manage its Ireland fab with greater flexibility. But, the financial strain on Intel is enormous. Intel must be under significant pressure to execute such a large buyback, one that does not increase fab capacity at all.

"Are we really sure Intel initiated this “joint venture” buyback? Or was Intel forced to buy back Apollo’s 49% stake because the JV contract entitled Apollo to a highly profitable exit once certain clauses were met, or not met?"

Another possibility is that Lip-Bu Tan is a smart guy, has better insight into the business than anyone on this forum, and made the right call. Don't know if that is the case or not, but if we're being fair, that needs to be put out there.
 
No way around looking at this as a short term “smart capital” decision being extraordinarily expensive in the medium/long term. Good for Intel going forward but just sad to see billions of Intel (and US taxpayer’s…) money going straight to a PE firm as a literal form of rent extraction.

Was anything of value actually provided to Intel in this deal? Did they actually achieve something with that fab that they wouldn’t have been able to otherwise? Sounds like… no.
 
No way around looking at this as a short term “smart capital” decision being extraordinarily expensive in the medium/long term. Good for Intel going forward but just sad to see billions of Intel (and US taxpayer’s…) money going straight to a PE firm as a literal form of rent extraction.
Was anything of value actually provided to Intel in this deal? Did they actually achieve something with that fab that they wouldn’t have been able to otherwise? Sounds like… no.
Maybe saving $Billions over the course of multiple years?
 
Another possibility is that Lip-Bu Tan is a smart guy, has better insight into the business than anyone on this forum, and made the right call. Don't know if that is the case or not, but if we're being fair, that needs to be put out there.

Certainly, any Intel CEO, current or past, knows Intel inside and out far more than bloggers on this forum. But that doesn’t mean their decisions were always smart. We all know that a series of poor decisions made by Intel leadership has contributed to the company’s struggles today.

In the case of this Apollo JV buyback, the current Intel CEO, Li-Bu Tan, likely has no choice but to honor the contractual agreement made by his predecessor, Pat Gelsinger. Mr. Tan understands exactly how much financial stress a $14.2 billion cash outflow will place on Intel, but he has no better option than to pay Apollo under contractual obligation.

One irony is that no other semiconductor company in the world uses this type of private‑equity‑funded fab project structure. Are they all not as “smart” as Intel? I remember Intel CFO David Zinsner saying, after the Brookfield–Intel JV announcement, that the cost of this type of deal falls somewhere between equity financing and a loan. But I also recall TSMC CFO Wendell Huang commenting that such private‑equity financing is simply too expensive. Now I understand why it’s too expensive. What David Zinsner said was untrue.

Did Pat Gelsinger or David Zinsner mislead the public (in my most polite wording)?

"The transaction represents Intel’s second Semiconductor Co-Investment Program (SCIP) arrangement. SCIP is an element of Intel’s Smart Capital strategy, a funding approach designed to create financial flexibility to accelerate the company’s strategy, including investing in its global manufacturing operations, while maintaining a strong balance sheet."

Source: https://newsroom.intel.com/corporate/co-invest-program-news-2024
 
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One irony is that no other semiconductor company in the world uses this type of private‑equity‑funded fab project structure. Are they all not as “smart” as Intel? I remember Intel CFO David Zinsner saying, after the Brookfield–Intel JV announcement, that the cost of this type of deal falls somewhere between equity financing and a loan. But I also recall TSMC CFO Wendell Huang commenting that such private‑equity financing is simply too expensive. Now I understand why it’s too expensive. What David Zinsner said was untrue.
Isn't Rapidus's 2nm effort at least partially funded in this manner?

(note, I'm not advocating this 'as a good method').
 
Curious, does your model show 18A is cost competitive when F52 is fully ramped? And what is your yield assumption when 18A is mature?

I'm assuming this is not based on a final product since that involves chips from multiple processes/vendors.
Actually we have a cost model for the final product. We have a model for TSM prices, die size, yield etc.

IFS sells wafers to Intel Products are market price. Once Fab 52 is fully loaded, and assuming they hit the yield roadmap, the IFS gross margin on the CPU will be slightly positve. OM is more difficult since 18A in running 1/3 the capacity planned at the end of 2026. The product Margin will be decided based on the pricing model. I personally think they need to tank the price to cost once Fab 52 is loaded as they are running way to many product lines and nodes now.

Obvously the margins on 18A and Panther lake are not good now (per CFO)
 
Actually we have a cost model for the final product. We have a model for TSM prices, die size, yield etc.

IFS sells wafers to Intel Products are market price. Once Fab 52 is fully loaded, and assuming they hit the yield roadmap, the IFS gross margin on the CPU will be slightly positve. OM is more difficult since 18A in running 1/3 the capacity planned at the end of 2026. The product Margin will be decided based on the pricing model. I personally think they need to tank the price to cost once Fab 52 is loaded as they are running way to many product lines and nodes now.

Obvously the margins on 18A and Panther lake are not good now (per CFO)
I guess DMR would help load that alongside Wild Cat Lake just my thought Intel shouldn't use Advanced Packing on Cheap stuff like smaller core count Panther Lake or future product this increases the cost for no benefits.
 
Isn't Rapidus's 2nm effort at least partially funded in this manner?

(note, I'm not advocating this 'as a good method').

They are different.

Rapidus is funded by the Japanese government (through grants and share purchases) and by many Japanese companies such as SoftBank, Sony, Toyota, NTT, Kioxia, NEC, and MUFG Bank. These are conventional equity investors with no guaranteed investment return, dividends, or exit clauses. This is no different from you or me buying 100 shares of Amazon or 1,000 shares of Google. As typical shareholders, we have no guaranteed returns or dividends, and aside from selling our shares on the stock market, we cannot force Intel to buy our shares back.

The Intel–Apollo and Intel–Brookfield joint ventures are essentially high‑interest loans in disguise. Brookfield and Apollo are guaranteed to receive a certain level of investment return and are provided with exit options, privileges that private equity firms typically demand.

Private equity firms are not white knights. Their business model depends on securing high returns and well protected exit mechanisms. Without those, they would not function as private equity at all.

Major credit rating agencies Fitch and S&P treated the 2022 Intel-Brookfield JV as debt‑like (rather than equity investment) because the transaction included contractual, fixed minimum dividend guarantees to the partner.

Then in 2024, Intel and Apollo learned from that experience and structured their deal so it would be treated as an equity investment instead of debt. But based on the high price Intel is now paying to buy back Apollo’s 49% stake, I am almost certain that Apollo received protections similar to those Brookfield received, even if they don’t call it a “high interest loan.”

One thing is certain: even if Intel Ireland paid the same price as TSMC or Samsung for an EUV machine, Intel’s additional costs (such as this Intel–Apollo JV and the buyback) will make Intel’s true production cost much higher than its peers.
 
Private equity firms are not white knights.
1000% agree - when I read Intel doing this originally, it changed my mind from "they are hurting" to "they are going to be insolvent, soon".

Fortunately they seem to be doing better now, but this type of financial "engineering" is never a good sign for the health of a company.
 
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