Intel 10% by 2030 still?

[jorgequinonez]

Intel's former CEO once set an ambitious target for the company to secure 10% of the foundry market by 2030. In your view, does this objective remain an unrealistic fantasy, or could the current surge in AI chip demand provide Intel a genuine opportunity to capture a mid-single-digit share, perhaps 5%, within that timeframe?

Disclaimer: I'm asking out of curiosity. I have nothing to do with the prediction markets.

 

[Barnsley]

Isnt 5% of a lot better than 10% of something smaller.

INTEL insterested in increasing volume no?

 

[hist78]

Intel's former CEO once set an ambitious target for the company to secure 10% of the foundry market by 2030. In your view, does this objective remain an unrealistic fantasy, or could the current surge in AI chip demand provide Intel a genuine opportunity to capture a mid-single-digit share, perhaps 5%, within that timeframe?

Disclaimer: I'm asking out of curiosity. I have nothing to do with the prediction markets.

Are you looking for 10% foundry market share for Intel Foundry with profit, or without profit?

 

[jorgequinonez]

Are you looking for 10% foundry market share for Intel Foundry with profit, or without profit?

Good point. How about both scenarios?

 

[siliconbruh999]

If they include Intel product they would easily reach that number by 2030

 

[Barnsley]

So is it 10% of Revenue or 10% of products shipped.

They are two different things are they not?

 

[siliconbruh999]

Yes and i think the target was 10% external revenue

 

[MKWVentures]

All that has changed based on the lack of traction. the goal was 15B in external revenue. Add that to internal and IFS makes sense.

and If intel is going to claim packaging as foundry, then you need to add in ASE and AMKOR.

Intel needs 15B in external revenue to make the finances make sense. The plan was 2030 for this. There is not line of sight to get there yet. Our model is that if ALL of the speculated commitments came true, they are about halfway to goal.

The intermediate goal should be to be a top 10 foundry in external revenue (wafer fab) and Top 5 packaging house in external revenue.

 

[siliconbruh999]

All that has changed based on the lack of traction. the goal was 15B in external revenue. Add that to internal and IFS makes sense.

and If intel is going to claim packaging as foundry, then you need to add in ASE and AMKOR.

Packing part of foundry so i see no reason to not include it packing.

Intel needs 15B in external revenue to make the finances make sense. The plan was 2030 for this. There is not line of sight to get there yet. Our model is that if ALL of the speculated commitments came true, they are about halfway to goal.

or have more Internal revenue imo they should target a mix of Internal+external revenue

The intermediate goal should be to be a top 10 foundry in external revenue (wafer fab) and Top 5 packaging house in external revenue.

I think this is a unfair metric cause every IDM includes themselves in this (Samsung for example)

 

[MKWVentures]

Packing part of foundry so i see no reason to not include it packing.

or have more Internal revenue imo they should target a mix of Internal+external revenue

I think this is a unfair metric cause every IDM includes themselves in this (Samsung for example)

Then you need to include all the packaging houses in the external foundry camp. In that case, IFS is not currently a top 20 source of packaging and foundry sales to other companies.

Intels internal doesnt matter. Intel cannot survive doing process development and fab just internal .... Swan Gelsinger LBT 100% agree on this. so you can combine them and say 35B or separate them and say 15B external.

Intel needs 15B annual external to survive. The plan is that most of this must be Fab. This has been the goal/requirement since 2021. the discussions at Intel today are no different than before. Just need to see some results

Right now IFS revenue is 95%+ Internal. it needs to be 50-60%. Again, No one at Intel disagrees with this..... Add onto that the fact that TSMC is a better process for some intel products and is chosen for the PPAC and that is another challenge

 

[hist78]

Then you need to include all the packaging houses in the external foundry camp. In that case, IFS is not currently a top 20 source of packaging and foundry sales to other companies.

Intels internal doesnt matter. Intel cannot survive doing process development and fab just internal .... Swan Gelsinger LBT 100% agree on this. so you can combine them and say 35B or separate them and say 15B external.

Intel needs 15B annual external to survive. The plan is that most of this must be Fab. This has been the goal/requirement since 2021. the discussions at Intel today are no different than before. Just need to see some results

Right now IFS revenue is 95%+ Internal. it needs to be 50-60%. Again, No one at Intel disagrees with this..... Add onto that the fact that TSMC is a better process for some intel products and is chosen for the PPAC and that is another challenge

According to Counterpoint Research, “Global ‘Foundry 2.0’ Market climb to a record $320 billion in revenues in 2025, driven by the AI boom.” Foundry 2.0 (including foundries and advanced packaging) is a term TSMC introduced to describe its business and total addressable market.

Intel Foundry (IF) generated about $17.1 billion in revenue in 2025, with an operating loss of $10.32 billion. This means Intel Foundry achieved a 5.34% market share in the 2025 Foundry 2.0 market by revenue.

Can Intel Foundry reach 10% of the Foundry 2.0 market by 2030? In my opinion, it’s possible but very difficult.

1. Financial sustainability and capital requirements

Intel CFO David Zinsner has said that major external foundry orders will require additional CapEx and could push the 2027 Intel Foundry breakeven target further out. In addition to the $10.32 billion loss in 2025, Intel Foundry posted a massive $13.4 billion loss on $17.6 billion of revenue in 2024. Can Intel sustain losses of this magnitude year after year in pursuit of 10% market share?

Yes, it’s possible that more external orders could improve utilization and yields, reducing losses and increasing output. But it’s unclear whether or to what extent these improvements can overcome the structural challenges Intel Foundry faces.

Achieving 10% market share would require billions more in investment. Does Intel have the financial strength to compete with TSMC and Samsung in capital spending to build more advanced fabs before 2030? The answer is probably no.

2. Contradictions inside the IDM 2.0 business model

The current IDM 2.0 model is full of contradictions and compromises. For example, if Intel Foundry aggressively prioritizes external customers in capacity, cost, and scheduling in order to gain more external customers, it could seriously hurt Intel’s own product competitiveness and revenue.

On one hand, Intel Foundry, as part of Intel’s IDM model, should give Intel’s product group preferential treatment. On the other hand, as a “trusted foundry,” Intel Foundry must treat internal and external customers equally. This is a contradiction that is extremely difficult to resolve.

Since last year, Intel leadership has repeatedly blamed Intel Foundry’s limited capacity for constraining Intel Product’s revenue and profit. If internal customers are already struggling to secure enough capacity, can Intel realistically invest heavily to satisfy more external customers?

Another contradiction: Intel has invested at least $11–12 billion in advanced packaging capacity, yet it has very few external EMIB customers. Meanwhile, Intel has already begun outsourcing EMIB manufacturing to Amkor’s South Korea operations. Why can’t Intel Foundry take this business itself if it truly wants to grow revenue and profit? Is Intel’s EMIB cost too high, the profit too low, or is the additional capital needed to expand EMIB capacity internally not financially viable?

And then there is another contradiction: Intel is considering licensing its 14A process technology to Elon Musk’s TeraFab. Intel spends billions developing each process node and billions more acquiring tools and building fabs. Why wouldn’t Intel Foundry take the manufacturing orders itself instead of selling its critical technology and creating a competitor?

These are just a few examples that will hinder Intel Foundry’s ability to grow to a 10% share of the global foundry market.

 

[Barnsley]

According to Counterpoint Research, “Global ‘Foundry 2.0’ Market climb to a record $320 billion in revenues in 2025, driven by the AI boom.” Foundry 2.0 (including foundries and advanced packaging) is a term TSMC introduced to describe its business and total addressable market.

Intel Foundry (IF) generated about $17.1 billion in revenue in 2025, with an operating loss of $10.32 billion. This means Intel Foundry achieved a 5.34% market share in the 2025 Foundry 2.0 market by revenue.

Can Intel Foundry reach 10% of the Foundry 2.0 market by 2030? In my opinion, it’s possible but very difficult.

1. Financial sustainability and capital requirements

Intel CFO David Zinsner has said that major external foundry orders will require additional CapEx and could push the 2027 Intel Foundry breakeven target further out. In addition to the $10.32 billion loss in 2025, Intel Foundry posted a massive $13.4 billion loss on $17.6 billion of revenue in 2024. Can Intel sustain losses of this magnitude year after year in pursuit of 10% market share?

Yes, it’s possible that more external orders could improve utilization and yields, reducing losses and increasing output. But it’s unclear whether or to what extent these improvements can overcome the structural challenges Intel Foundry faces.

Achieving 10% market share would require billions more in investment. Does Intel have the financial strength to compete with TSMC and Samsung in capital spending to build more advanced fabs before 2030? The answer is probably no.

2. Contradictions inside the IDM 2.0 business model

The current IDM 2.0 model is full of contradictions and compromises. For example, if Intel Foundry aggressively prioritizes external customers in capacity, cost, and scheduling in order to gain more external customers, it could seriously hurt Intel’s own product competitiveness and revenue.

On one hand, Intel Foundry, as part of Intel’s IDM model, should give Intel’s product group preferential treatment. On the other hand, as a “trusted foundry,” Intel Foundry must treat internal and external customers equally. This is a contradiction that is extremely difficult to resolve.

Since last year, Intel leadership has repeatedly blamed Intel Foundry’s limited capacity for constraining Intel Product’s revenue and profit. If internal customers are already struggling to secure enough capacity, can Intel realistically invest heavily to satisfy more external customers?

Another contradiction: Intel has invested at least $11–12 billion in advanced packaging capacity, yet it has very few external EMIB customers. Meanwhile, Intel has already begun outsourcing EMIB manufacturing to Amkor’s South Korea operations. Why can’t Intel Foundry take this business itself if it truly wants to grow revenue and profit? Is Intel’s EMIB cost too high, the profit too low, or is the additional capital needed to expand EMIB capacity internally not financially viable?

And then there is another contradiction: Intel is considering licensing its 14A process technology to Elon Musk’s TeraFab. Intel spends billions developing each process node and billions more acquiring tools and building fabs. Why wouldn’t Intel Foundry take the manufacturing orders itself instead of selling its critical technology and creating a competitor?

These are just a few examples that will hinder Intel Foundry’s ability to grow to a 10% share of the global foundry market.

Do Intel want market share or increase in revenue in your opinion?

Would they be happy with 40Bn in revenue if market share stayed they same or would they rather have 30Bn on 10% share of market revenue wise?

 

[hist78]

Right now IFS revenue is 95%+ Internal. it needs to be 50-60%.

I did some calculations, and here are the actual figures showing the percentage of Intel Foundry’s revenue that came from external customers. The trend does not suggest that Intel Foundry is anywhere close to breaking even. This is especially concerning given that Intel Foundry is currently short on capacity for internal customers. Heavy spending will be required to serve both internal needs and external customers effectively.

Intel Foundry Revenue, Loss, and External Customers

 

[hist78]

Do Intel want market share or increase in revenue in your opinion?

Would they be happy with 40Bn in revenue if market share stayed they same or would they rather have 30Bn on 10% share of market revenue wise?

Good question. In my opinion, the semiconductor market has changed dramatically and continues to change rapidly. For example, traditional client and server CPU demand is increasingly being met by the internal fabless design teams of many large companies. Intel CEO Li‑Bu Tan and CFO David Zinsner have pointed out that CPU demand is rising due to the needs of agentic AI. But I hope they also recognize that Intel is no longer the only CPU vendor with a “little sister” called AMD.

There are now many competitors producing server and/or client CPUs, such as Apple, Nvidia, AMD, Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Meta, Qualcomm, MediaTek, Samsung, and ARM. Many of these companies have far larger revenue bases and stronger financial positions than Intel. Several of them also have captive internal customers. They viewed their in‑house designed CPUs as key competitive advantages.

So to answer your question: Intel (and AMD) needs to prioritize revenue, profit, and the quality of revenue above everything else. Market share is still important, but it is becoming increasingly misleading. If Intel can generate $30 billion in annual revenue while earning $10 billion in net profit, isn’t that far better than Intel’s 2025 result of $52.9 billion in revenue with only $300 million in net profit?

 

[MKWVentures]

I did some calculations, and here are the actual figures showing the percentage of Intel Foundry’s revenue that came from external customers. The trend does not suggest that Intel Foundry is anywhere close to breaking even. This is especially concerning given that Intel Foundry is currently short on capacity for internal customers. Heavy spending will be required to serve both internal needs and external customers effectively.

Intel Foundry Revenue, Loss, and External Customers

View attachment 4596

correct and half of the external is not really external.... it is Altera.
the revenue increase in Q1 2016 was due to 18A wafers being sold to product group for about 30K each and Intel 3 valume increase.

All this from 10Q

 

[hist78]

Good question. In my opinion, the semiconductor market has changed dramatically and continues to change rapidly. For example, traditional client and server CPU demand is increasingly being met by the internal fabless design teams of many large companies. Intel CEO Li‑Bu Tan and CFO David Zinsner have pointed out that CPU demand is rising due to the needs of agentic AI. But I hope they also recognize that Intel is no longer the only CPU vendor with a “little sister” called AMD.

There are now many competitors producing server and/or client CPUs, such as Apple, Nvidia, AMD, Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Meta, Qualcomm, MediaTek, Samsung, and ARM. Many of these companies have far larger revenue bases and stronger financial positions than Intel. Several of them also have captive internal customers. They viewed their in‑house designed CPUs as key competitive advantages.

So to answer your question: Intel (and AMD) needs to prioritize revenue, profit, and the quality of revenue above everything else. Market share is still important, but it is becoming increasingly misleading. If Intel can generate $30 billion in annual revenue while earning $10 billion in net profit, isn’t that far better than Intel’s 2025 result of $52.9 billion in revenue with only $300 million in net profit?

Amazon CEO Andy Jassy recently revealed that Amazon’s in‑house semiconductor group has a revenue run rate of $50 billion a year, if it were an independent company. And Amazon is not alone. Many companies, including Microsoft, Meta, Google, Apple, and even Lego, now operate their own in‑house fabless design teams. Unless these companies disclose the estimated revenue of their internal semiconductor operations, I don’t think current market share surveys can capture the true size of the market.

To put this into perspective, Intel’s 2025 revenue was $52.9 billion. Amazon’s in‑house semiconductor group is essentially as large as Intel in terms of revenue. And even if we discount Andy Jassy’s number by 50% in case he exaggerated, that would still be equivalent to half of Intel’s 2025 revenue.

 

[swka]

Amazon CEO Andy Jassy recently revealed that Amazon’s in‑house semiconductor group has a revenue run rate of $50 billion a year, if it were an independent company. And Amazon is not alone. Many companies, including Microsoft, Meta, Google, Apple, and even Lego, now operate their own in‑house fabless design teams. Unless these companies disclose the estimated revenue of their internal semiconductor operations, I don’t think current market share surveys can capture the true size of the market.

To put this into perspective, Intel’s 2025 revenue was $52.9 billion. Amazon’s in‑house semiconductor group is essentially as large as Intel in terms of revenue.

an indirect way to look at how much % chip development system or hyperscaler have is to look at EDA revenue distribution. I have seen some put 45% of EDA from these companies, which I think is too high. it is probably closer to 30%

 

[dkr1986]

I did some calculations, and here are the actual figures showing the percentage of Intel Foundry’s revenue that came from external customers. The trend does not suggest that Intel Foundry is anywhere close to breaking even. This is especially concerning given that Intel Foundry is currently short on capacity for internal customers. Heavy spending will be required to serve both internal needs and external customers effectively.

Intel Foundry Revenue, Loss, and External Customers

View attachment 4596

Just FYI, Adjusted for one time charges, 2024 Operating Loss would be also mid 50s% only.

Now lets ask what happened in 2023,2024 & 2025? Intel started outsourcing a significant % of its wafers to TSMC. Intel management said about 30% of outsourced wafer at a peak. Also they had high node ramping\starting costs for Intel 4, Intel 3, Intel 18A due to accelerated node development process.

That ramp has slow down and its effect on operating loss will go away as they will use incremental nodes for future products 18A ->18A-P->18A-U etc, eventually 14A ramp cost will show up but not before 2027 per CEO commentary.

Now with Panther Lake wafers coming back mostly internal and Nova lake will be improving on that, so this operating loss % will come back down over time. As yield improves on 18A & Intel 3 and as volume ramps up on 18A & Intel 3, I expect this loss to move towards to 0% (break even). This is evident in Q1'2026, margin improved 10% QoQ. We will see how this metric progresses over the next 8 quarters & if Intel can achieve 0% as originally targeted. (Exiting 2027 with Intel Foundry breakeven on operating profit basis)

In 2021/2022, Intel foundry had 0% gross margin and still negative operating margins because it was being operated as an IDM foundry (Wafers sold to products at cost with no profit motive). When Products team started souring wafer from TSMC, Intel Foundry gross margin turned negative (mainly because of underutilization & high startup costs), ofc operating margin became even more negative. Now with foundry charging market prices to Intel Products team, Foundry P&L is mainly dependent on wafer volume. It does not matter internal or external. If they can completely decouple from TSMC and still effectively compete with 100% wafer at Intel Foundry, that is a good thing for Intel Foundry P&L.

With TSMC capacity constrained due to being too conservative, I think more and more customers are looking at Intel Foundry seriously and that threshold of wafer volume required for Intel Foundry to flourish is not too far away.