Looking for stats going back to the 60s

[nghanayem]

@jms_embedded The article by Williams and Khan is very good. You can see the consensus building. The critical comments about the science policy approach of the 90s (the so-called road map that we all followed) was most interesting. The establishment of NSTC could lead to the same outcome and not in fact revive domestic manufacturing. I also loved the jab at intel wrt to supply chain. agree wholeheartedly that on the whole, intel was not a good force for the US industry writ large.

Interesting read, but if I was to critique the article I would reject the notion that the US is not a technical innovator in semis nor does it have any skilled manpower left. Take away the support and R&D that Lam, AMAT, KLA, and Cymer give to SK, TSMC, and Samsung and their node development would grind to a halt. Without the vendors we would all be rubbing sticks together and bashing rocks. It is also the indisputable reality that the lion's share of tool research and development is happening in the US, JP, and the EU rather than the ROK or the ROC.

 

[mozartct]

Interesting read, but if I was to critique the article I would reject the notion that the US is not a technical innovator in semis nor does it have any skilled manpower left. Take away the support and R&D that Lam, AMAT, KLA, and Cymer give to SK, TSMC, and Samsung and their node development would grind to a halt. Without the vendors we would all be rubbing sticks together and bashing rocks. It is also the indisputable reality that the lion's share of tool research and development is happening in the US, JP, and the EU rather than the ROK or the ROC.

You are correct - I overstated the case. OEMs are the unsung heroes in this thing. As to your larger point, the US is an innovator but it's weak in implementation in terms of actual chip making. Blame high costs, blame Wall Street, blame business models, blame all three!

If you think about AT&T, they were a captive chip maker pursuing cutting edge (at one point). Keeping up with peers meant investing beyond was they could afford as a captive chip maker and so they got out. More or less the same for IBM though they did have external customers. That is the fundamental weakness IMO of the intel re-invention.

 

[TICin852]

Could you provide the graphics you are putting together? I'd love to see them but won't be at ASMC.

 

[mozartct]

Not sure about graphics (because of SEMI copyright) but I will post a summary under a new post.

 

[Tanj]

"total worldwide market". I wonder if that "market" included captive production especially IBM, who were 70% of all computers by the early 70's.

 

[mozartct]

"total worldwide market". I wonder if that "market" included captive production especially IBM, who were 70% of all computers by the early 70's.

I had not considered that detail. I am not sure how or if ICs would have been broken out for firms making AND using their own chips. Can't see why they would. It's a good comment but too late to incorporate into my panel. I know for a fact that IBM's pursuit of semi technology (in the present) is premised on developing a comparative advantage in hardware (servers), not in selling licensing deals although that is a revenue stream indeed.

 

[Tanj]

IBM fabs were at the leading edge until the mid-90s. Amongst the last things they pioneered were copper with damascene, CMP, and the high metal counts that CMP enabled. They also developed a lot of the packaging we now take for granted. But their obsession with ECL for mainframes, and their general closed market, resulted in them being too outside the mainstream and too small to keep up with the investments when IBM lost profitability to the rise of minicomputers. What you see today is just a small remaining R&D core of what used to be one of the leading semiconductor outfits.

In the 1960s I see no reason they would have participated in any nascent industry market surveys.

 

[mozartct]

IBM fabs were at the leading edge until the mid-90s. Amongst the last things they pioneered were copper with damascene, CMP, and the high metal counts that CMP enabled. They also developed a lot of the packaging we now take for granted. But their obsession with ECL for mainframes, and their general closed market, resulted in them being too outside the mainstream and too small to keep up with the investments when IBM lost profitability to the rise of minicomputers. What you see today is just a small remaining R&D core of what used to be one of the leading semiconductor outfits.

In the 1960s I see no reason they would have participated in any nascent industry market surveys.

IBM was my largest customer for many years. Novellus/LAM plating, CMP, X-ray photomasks, and many other things came out of IBM. I add that they were a benevolent force, compared to their brethren whoc can,t be bothered to attend conferences, let alone organize them. Of course, that "culture" was made possible by the large margins on big iron.

You are right, in many ways, IBM is a neutron star. Powerful but a remnant nonetheless.